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Modern websites set multiple authentication cookies during
the login process to allow users to remain authenticated over
the duration of a web session. Web applications use cookie-
based authentication to provide different levels of access and
authorization; the complexity of websites’ code and various
combinations of authentication cookies that allow such access
introduce potentially serious vulnerabilities. For example, an
on-path attacker can trick a victim’s browser into revealing in-
secure authentication cookies for any site, even if the site itself
is always accessed over HTTPS. Analyzing the susceptibility
of websites to such attacks first requires a way to identify a
website’s authentication cookies. We developed an algorithm
to determine the set of cookies that serve as authentication
cookies for a particular site. Using this algorithm, which we
implemented as a Chrome extension, we tested 45 websites
and found that an attacker can gain access to a user’s sensitive
information on sites such as GoDaddy, Yahoo Search, Com-
cast, LiveJournal, stumbleupon, and Netflix. In cases where
these sites cannot enable site-wide HTTPS, we offer recom-
mendations for using authentication cookies that reduce the
likelihood of attack. Based on these recommendations, we
develop a tool, Newton, that website administrators can use
to audit the security of a site’s cookie-based authentication
and users can run to identify vulnerabilities at runtime.
1 Introduction
The web’s core protocol, the Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP), is inherently stateless; to manage higher-level appli-
cation state, web applications commonly store information
about user sessions in “cookies”; each website sets a collec-
tion of cookies on a user’s local machine, which the user’s
browser sends to the server hosting the website on each sub-
sequent request. Cookie contents are diverse and may contain
information ranging from user preferences (e.g., does the user
prefer a white or black background) to locality (e.g., what lan-
guage the site should be rendered in) to transaction state (e.g.,
what is currently contained in a user’s shopping cart). Addi-
tionally, many websites use cookies to authenticate users to a
website, and various cookies may also indicate to the server
whether or not a user is currently logged into the website.
Customarily, a user may initially log into a website using
a username and password. To prevent the user from having
to re-enter these credentials in subsequent interaction with
the website, the server typically sets authentication cookies
(auth-cookies), which the browser automatically returns with
each subsequent HTTP request until the user’s session expires.
The web server hosting the sit checks these auth-cookies to
determine whether any particular HTTP request is authorized
to perform the operation associated with that request (e.g.,
access a particular webpage, add an item to a shopping card,
obtain personal profile details). Thus, once a user initially
authenticates to a web server, the auth-cookies are a critical
security linchpin: In many cases, access to these auth-cookies
gives an attacker complete control over a user’s account.
Individual cookies contain attributes such as secure
(which prevents snooping cookies over insecure connections)
and HTTPonly (which prevents cookie theft via cross-site
scripting), but, the complexity of modern websites and ser-
vices makes it difficult to secure all of these cookies. Popular
websites sometimes have incorrect security settings on auth-
cookies; for example, in May 2014, the incorrect security
settings of WordPress’s auth-cookies left users vulnerable to
session hijacking attacks [2]. Although the public is becom-
ing increasingly aware of these types of vulnerabilities, our
results show that they remain prevalent in practice.
In the past, web applications were simple and would use
only a few auth-cookies (in most cases, only one) to con-
trol access to the account. Researchers already have pub-
lished recommendations to make web sessions secure in these
cases [13]. Yet, modern web applications are significantly
more complex. These applications often have millions of
lines of code and reuse legacy code from other components;
they are designed and implemented by large teams of devel-
opers are frequently modified. Moreover, today’s web sites
and applications are multi-faceted, and “login” or “authenti-
1
cation” is no longer strictly binary: For example, a user may
have different authorization or access to different parts of a
web site (e.g., a user might have the ability to view account
balances but not to execute trades, or add items to a shopping
cart but not purchase items or ship to a different address).
The complex nature of authorization for modern web appli-
cations makes it increasingly common for these applications
to use multiple authentication cookies, the combination of
which determine the user’s login status or ability to access
different parts of a web site. More than half of the 45 sites
that we analyzed set more than 20 cookies, and more than ten
of these sites use multiple authentication cookies. Websites
use multiple authentication cookies for several reasons: Some
portions of a website may be loaded over HTTPS, while other
portions of a site may be loaded over cleartext HTTP; a user
on the same site may operate under different roles (e.g., ad-
ministrator, user, site owner, moderator); a site may have
many different services or “properties” under the same do-
main; and finally, the cookies that a site uses to authenticate a
user may change regularly. For example, Google has multiple
applications including mail, search, and calendar; we find
that each of these offerings uses different combinations of
authentication cookies. Sometimes, the combinations change
regularly: for example, the authentication cookies for Gmail
have already changed three times since December 2013.
The evolving nature of authentication cookies in modern
web applications begs for a re-appraisal of the use of auth-
cookies for web authentication and the potential vulnerabili-
ties that their misuse may induce on real sites. In light of mod-
ern web applications and websites, we must also develop new
recommendations for best practices when using auth-cookies
to authenticate users on modern websites. The misuse of au-
thentication cookies in a web application’s design can result
in unintended security vulnerabilities, particularly in certain
settings where a user may also be vulnerable to traffic snoop-
ing or cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. Because different
parts of the application can be accessed over HTTP (non-
confidential content), or HTTPS (confidential content), a web
application developer may not set the secure attribute on
some authentication cookies if they would be sent on normal
HTTP connection. Each such decision of whether to set the
secure flag on an auth-cookie may be correct individually,
but due to complex access control code paths, an attacker may
be able to gain access to privileged information with access
to only a subset of cookies whose secure attribute is not
set. In scenarios where an intermediary is on-path (e.g., any
open WiFi network, such as a coffee shop, airport, or even a
friend’s house), an attacker might gain access to all cookies
whose secure attribute is not set. In these settings, for many
web sites, we demonstrate that an on-path entity can gain all
of the information needed to compromise a user’s account for
a given web application.
Before deploying a web application, a web administrator
should assess and eradicate the vulnerabilities that result from
cookie-based web authentication. Similarly, users can receive
warnings when a web session is vulnerable to auth-cookie
hijacking. Both cases require identifying the auth-cookie com-
bination that authorizes a user to perform a specific operation
on a site and auditing those auth-cookies for vulnerabilities.
Although it might appear simple for an application developer
or website administrator to simply check the source code of
an application for such vulnerabilities, tracing all possible ex-
ecution paths through complex web applications that set many
cookies is a challenging problem in and of itself. We treat the
web application as a black box, which makes our approach
applicable for both website administrators and users.
The naïve approach to determining the specific combina-
tion of cookies that determines a user’s authorization to per-
form some action is combinatorial. We develop an algorithm
to reduce the time for computing the authentication cookies
for a site to polynomial time and incorporate this algorithm
into a tool, Newton, which helps website administrators audit
their sites for potential vulnerabilities.
This paper presents the following contributions:
• We develop an algorithm to discover the auth-cookie
combinations that will authenticate a user to any service
on a website. Our algorithm also derives the unique auth-
cookie combinations that allow a user to access different
sub-services (or “properties”) on the same website. We
show how using this algorithm helps us identify the auth-
cookies combinations in practical time.
• We implemented the algorithm to discover auth-cookies
for a site as a Chrome browser extension, Newton. The
tool treats each web application as a black box and op-
erates without any prior or privileged knowledge about
either the website or the user. Administrators can use
Newton to run security audits on installed Web applica-
tions (whether or not they have source-code access), and
users can avoid or curtail interaction with sites that are
vulnerable to session hijacking.
• Using Newton, we analyzed combinations of auth-
cookies to audit 45 websites; we found 29 sites where
the use of auth-cookies is insecure in some way. Many
of these vulnerabilities arise because of logic errors in
how the application handles auth-cookies. For example,
on 18 different websites, the web application does not in-
validate old auth-cookies when the user logs out, leaving
the user vulnerable to replay attacks.
• We analyze the vulnerabilities we discovered to develop
specific recommendations for designing more secure
client authentication mechanisms using auth-cookies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides background on Web cookies and cookie-based authen-
tication. Section 3 discusses our specific goals to make our
solution scalable for large number of users and sites and the
challenges we faced in doing so. Section 4 details our solution
and our insight to reduce the effort in verifying the search
space. In Section 5, we describe implementation challenges
to make the solution deployable across many users. Section 6
presents the auth-cookie combinations that we automatically
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Figure 1: The general operation of Web cookies.
discovered for major services. Section 7 discusses both the
limitations of our approach and avenues for future work. Sec-
tion 8 discusses related work, and Section 9 concludes.
2 Background
We present general background on web cookie operation and
how different cookie attribute settings can affect the security
of web client authentication. We then describe authentication
cookies and scenarios where these cookies might be stolen
or otherwise compromised. Finally, we present an overview
of an algorithm to determine which cookies on a website
correspond to the user’s authentication cookies.
2.1 General Web Cookie Operation
An HTTP cookie is the state management mechanism that
HTTP has used since its initial design. A cookie has proper-
ties such as name, value, flags, expiration data, and a match
rule. A match rule has a domain and path components. The
web server when sets cookies and the respective values for
each cookie in HTTP responses using the Set-Cookie di-
rective. Whenever a browser makes an HTTP request to a
URL, the browser first compares that URL against all present
cookies’ match rules for that domain. The browser will then
automatically send those cookies whose match rules evalu-
ate to true for that URL. To determine whether a cookie’s
match rule is satisfied, the browser first compares the domain
name in the match rule with the domain in the URL of the
HTTP request. If the domain of the cookie starts with “.”,
then any subdomain of the subsequent domain will match;
otherwise, the cookie only matches if the domain name of
the URL exactly matches the domain in the cookie. If the
domain matches, then the browser evaluates whether the path
specified in the cookie matches the path in the URL; if a
match exists for both the domain and path attributes, then the
browser returns the cookie with the HTTP request.
Figure 1 shows the process where a user Bob requests a
service on a.com to login andza access a resource. After
Bob has logged in, the site sets the sess-id, locale, and
priv-sess-id cookies. The locale cookie has a match
rule with domain and path attributes that match any requested
URLs on a.com. Thus, the browser will send this cookie
with any HTTP request that the browser sends to a.com. On
the other hand, the sess-id cookie has a domain match part
equal to .myaccount.a.com, and thus is only returned
with requests for myaccount.a.com or any subdomain
(e.g., search.services.myaccount.a.com).
Since both cookies’ path match attributes are /
the cookies match all paths. The more restricted
priv-sess-id cookie will match against the exact
domain private.myaccount.com and paths such as
/ccn or /ccn/card1.
Each cookie also has two boolean attributes, HttpOnly
and Secure, which further restricts a web site’s ability to
access a particular cookie. A web application’s Javascript
code, which runs in a user’s browser, can read, write, and
delete cookies created by the same domain [5]. If the
cookie’s HttpOnly flag is set to true, however, then even
Javascript from the same domain cannot read that cookie. The
HttpOnly mechanism thwarts potential XSS exploits for
the site from pretending to have originated from the targeted
site, reading its sensitive cookies and leaking them to an at-
tacker. Cookies also have a Secure attribute; if this attribute
is set, then the browser will only return the cookie over an SS-
L/TLS channel. After a cookie’s expiry date, the browser will
automatically purge the cookie from the cookiestore. If the
web server does not set an expiry date on a cookie, then the
cookies is a session cookie, which the browser will automati-
cally deleted when the user quits the web browser application.
In practice, most users rarely terminate their web browsers,
so session cookies can persist for long periods of time.
2.2 Authentication Cookies (“Auth-Cookies”)
A web server typically sets authentication cookies (“auth-
cookies”) when a user initially authenticates to the web server
(e.g., with a username and password). These cookies allow
a user to perform various privileged operations on a site; dif-
ferent combinations of auth-cookies may authorize different
actions on a website. For example, in Figure 1, sess-id is
an auth-cookie that allows the user to access profile informa-
tion, whereas cookie priv-sess-id allows access to more
sensitive information, such as a credit card number. Auth-
cookies also ensure that a user’s session remains continuous
in case connectivity is interrupted (e.g., due to termination of
a TCP session or a change in the user’s IP address). Because
these cookies allow the user to perform various operations
without re-entering credentials, they are extremely valuable
to attackers.
3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12













Figure 2: The cumulative number of auth-cookies present on ex-
plored different sub-services on various websites. The number of
sub-services that we explored on each site is given in parentheses
next to the site name. Many other sites that we have not shown used
two auth-cookies.
2.3 When Auth-Cookies Can Be Stolen
Of course, any on-path attacker can sniff cookies that are not
encrypted via HTTPS. Thus, auth-cookies that are sent over
unencrypted channels (e.g., cleartext HTTP) are cause for
concern. Additionally, a vulnerable DNS server would allow
an attacker to poison its cache and reroute victim’s traffic
to machines under attacker’s control [3]. Below, we present
several plausible scenarios where an attacker can cause the
user’s browser to divulge auth-cookies for a specific site.
Man-in-the-middle attack with DNS traffic manipulation.
An on-path attacker or any attacker who can control and
manipulate DNS traffic destined for a user’s machine—as is
the case with untrusted WiFi hotspots, DNS servers that are
vulnerable to cache poisoning, or rogue ISPs—can induce
the user’s browser to submit all auth-cookies without the
secure flag across any site where the user is logged in.
To illustrate the subtlety of this attack, suppose that the
victim is logged into a Yahoo mail accout and always accesses
mail.yahoo.com over HTTPS; suppose also that that the
secure flag is not set on the sess-id auth-cookie for
mail.yahoo.com. In this case, HTTPS provides a false
sense of security: To hijack the user’s session, the attacker
might resolve DNS lookups for the domains of embedded
resources (e.g., advertisements) to (or through) a machine that
is under the user’s control. The attacker can then inject new
content in place of existing ads, such as <img>http://
mail.yahoo.com/gotyou.jpg</img>. Even gener-
ally reputable ISPs have performed such attacks in the past:
for example, a large French ISP, Orange, was performing
this type of ad substitution [18]. Once the victim’s browser
receives this modified advertisement, his browser will try to
fetch this image causing the browser to issue an HTTP request
to retrieve the image. At this point, the user’s browser would
send the sess-id with this request in plaintext.
Compromised third-party Javascript. Javascript that a
webmaster hosts on a webpage has full permissions and ac-
cess to cookies for that domain unless the cookies have the
HttpOnly attribute set. In these cases, if auth-cookies do
not have this attribute set, an attacker may be able to read
the cookies for that domain. This scenario may arise in cases
when a webmaster includes Javascript from an untrusted or
third-party developer (e.g., site owners sometimes include
Javascript for purposes of tracking, analytics, or function-
ality); in other cases, the site that hosts a webpage may be
compromised, allowing third parties to include Javascript
on the host page. Another significant problem is fetching
Javascript code from expired or mis-typed domains by web
applications not maintained properly. If an attacker regis-
ters such a domain and starts hosting malicious Javascript,
then all the users of site that include this Javascript become
vulnerable [21].
Cross-site scripting. An XSS vulnerability exists whenever
one site trusts user input and presents it to another site without
sanitizing it first. These attacks are significant when input
from one user would be exposed to another user. Prime
candidates for these attacks are social networking sites where
users interact with each other frequently. Even on financial
sites such as banking, one user may send a message to another
while transferring money. We acknowledge that mounting this
attack is challenging because vulnerabilities are site-specific.
Yet, considering that XSS is one of the most widely present
web vulnerabilities and has been discovered in almost all top
websites [23], it is still worth considering that an attacker may
be able to steal cookies via an XSS attack.
2.4 Why Existing Defenses Are Insufficient
It is reasonable to think that perhaps all cookies should have
the secure (or at least HttpOnly) attribute set, to prevent
attacks such as the ones we have outlined. Unfortunately,
such an approach is too coarse. Setting HttpOnly on all
cookies is not a viable approach because some Javascript
occasionally needs legitimate access to a user cookie. One
example are “double submit cookies”, a mechanism to pre-
vent cross-site request forgery whereby a web client sends a
random value in both a cookie and a request parameter and
the server checks that the two values are equal [24]. Addition-
ally, setting secure on all cookies is not practical because
sometimes (often for performance reasons) an application
may serve content over both HTTP and HTTPS.
A security mechanism called HTTP Strict Transport Se-
curity (HSTS) defends against certain types of man-in-the
middle attacks by forcing certain HTTP transfers to occur
over HTTPS, whenever possible. Unforunately, HSTS is not
a silver bullet solution. Forcehttps [19], which inspired HSTS,
acknowledges that due to various complexities of a website’s
code, deploying HSTS would require very careful analysis of
a site, shifting of subdomains wherever necessary; sometimes,
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reorganizing a site to use HSTS without breaking the site’s
functionality is not even possible. Even if HSTS is deployed,
it may not be configured correctly and can thus still be vul-
nerable to SSL downgrading attacks [15]. As a result of these
practicalities, HSTS is still not widely deployed: according
to one report from July 2014 [27], only 1,756 sites out of
approximately 150,000 popular sites had deployed HSTS.
Furthermore, some browsers such as Internet Explorer do not
even support HSTS [17].
Because simple coarse grained approaches are not suffi-
cient, users, web application developers, and website oper-
ators need better tools to compute a site’s auth-cookies to
better assess and defend against potential attacks. The first
step in protecting a user’s auth-cookies involves determining
which cookies are auth-cookies in the first place. The next
section explains why this problem is challenging.
3 Computing Auth-Cookies
We want to compute auth-cookies both at design time (to help
website administrators) and at runtime (to help users); these
requirements impose significant challenges. We aim to design
a tool for computing auth-cookies that is both general (i.e., it
should compute auth-cookies on as many sites as possible)
and transparent (i.e., it should not interfere with a user’s
active sessions to any site). In this section, we outline the
challenges that we faced in realizing this goal.
3.1 Strawman Approach
Given a general webpage and cookies set by the webpage’s
domain, we want to find out which combination of cookies
will allow access to that webpage. To do so requires gener-
ating combinations of cookies and fetch webpage under test
with only those cookies enabled. At a high level, our solution
proceeds as follows:
1. fetch a webpage without suppressing any cookies,
2. generate combination of cookies to be disabled and then
fetching a webpage with rest of the cookies enabled.
3. compare the response page with the one fetched in
Step 1.
4. if the webpage is not fetched successfully, then we mark
the disabled cookies combination as a required combina-
tion to access that webpage.
Unfortunately, determining whether the page fetch succeeded
is difficult; it is also application-specific. For example, failure
modes include showing error message, redirecting the user to
a login page, or redirecting to default front page. One could
use various statistical or image comparison techniques to com-
pare the two pages, but the threshold to define statistically
significant results will still vary from site to site. For example,
on a site such as Google Mail, the difference between fetched
default webpage at mail.google.com when auth-cookies
are suppressed vs. when they are not, can be detected using a
statistical or image comparison algorithm. On the other hand,
on sites like Amazon, there is practically no difference be-
tween fetched default webpage www.amazon.com whether
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Figure 3: A distribution showing the number of cookies that each
of 45 popular websites set on a user’s machine. Half of these sites
set more than 20 cookies.
one suppresses auth-cookies or not, because Amazon is an e-
commerce web site that shows a user product advertisements
on the front page whether the user is logged in or not.
We observe that on most sites, when a user is logged in
and the browser sends all cookies to the server, the username
is usually present somewhere at the top of the page or on
the left side of the page. Thus, testing whether an HTTP
request was performed as a logged-in user reduces to checking
whether the user’s username is present somewhere on the
page where usernames normally appear. Of course, there
are exceptions that to not conform to this heuristic, but we
found this heuristic to work very well on a large number of
sites; our implementation can always be extended to handle
these less-frequent corner cases. Naturally, making such
an algorithm work in practice entails a considerable set of
additional challenges, which we now describe.
3.2 Computing Auth-Cookies is Hard
Many practical complications require us to adapt the basic ap-
proach we described. In this section, we describe the practical
challenges assoicated with computing auth-cookies.
3.2.1 Many possible cookie combinations
The search space is exponential. A browser often handles
at least 50 cookies per domain, with the size of each cookie as
large as 4,096 bytes [4]. Figure 3 highlights the complexity of
this problem, showing a distribution of the number of cookies
that 45 different popular websites set—more than half of the
sites set 20 cookies. In the case of some domains such as
Google, we saw as many as 130 cookies being set for a single
domain. For many sites, any one of multiple combinations of
auth-cookies can allow a user to access a site. Determining
all possible combinations of auth-cookies that give a user
access to a site or service is thus exponential in the number
of cookies that the site sets. If a site sets 50 cookies (as in
the case of Google, which sometimes sets as many as 120
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cookies), then assuming a page load time of 200 ms, then
testing all combinations could take about 7 million years.1
Focusing only on login cookies doesn’t work. One might
assume that the cookies that serve as auth-cookie combina-
tions will only be set during login process. This turns out to
be false. In other words, it might be reasonable to assume
that when a user visits a website, enters a password, and suc-
cessfully logs in to the website, the cookies set during this
process—the “login cookies”—will contain the auth-cookies.
For example, when a user logs in to Google, we observe
that usually between 14–20 cookies are set, compared to the
80–120 cookies that the site sets over the course of a user’s in-
teractions with the site. If we only searched for auth-cookies
combinations by exhausting all combinations of the login
cookies, we would significantly reduce our search space. Yet,
for authorization to Google Calendar, the auth-cookie is only
set after user visits that part of the site but is set without re-
quiring the user to log in again. (The auth-cookie for Google
Calendar is not set during the normal login process in Google.)
In another case, Amazon does not delete or change many of
the auth-cookies after a user logs out. These auth-cookies
will not be explicitly set during subsequent logins, so simply
searching among the set of cookies that are set at login time
does not work.
Identifying auth-cookies by cookie properties doesn’t
work. One might assume that if a cookie value looks random,
is “long enough”, and changes across multiple login sessions
then it can be assumed to be a part of auth-cookie combina-
tion. On the other hand, if the auth-cookie value does not
change across login sessions or does not have enough entropy,
then it is not a part of auth-cookies. Unfortunately, we ob-
served that some cookies that do not satisfy these properties
are still part of the auth-cookie combination. For example, in
case of Facebook, the c_user cookie is a part of the auth-
cookie combination; yet, this cookie appears to serve as some
type of a user ID and does not change across login sessions.
Similarly, in the case of Twitter, the _twitter_sess
cookie is set to some opaque 200-character string that changes
across login sessions. Its name and its changing value sug-
gest that it may be an auth-cookie, but it is not. Instead, the
auth_token cookie whose 40 hex character value remains
constant across login sessions is the sole auth-cookie!
3.2.2 Different websites with unique designs
Computing auth-cookies for as many sites as possible re-
quires a field deployment with real users. It is easy to
generate auth-cookie combinations in controlled laboratory
experiments using a modified browser environment such as
1This problem is NP-hard. A SAT-problem with ’N’ variables can be
solved in polynomial time by an oracle for this problem. For this, we can
construct a privileged operation that is performed by the web server only if the
SAT-equation is satisfied. The browser also has ’N’ cookies corresponding
to ’N’ variables. Assignment to each of the ’N’ variables at the server side
is decided by which cookies are present in the HTTP request. An oracle
can decide the existence of the auth-cookies combinations to execute the
privileged operation ultimately solving the SAT problem in polynomial time.
Selenium. This approach makes it possible to compute auth-
cookie combinations for sites where we already have ac-
counts, but does not allow us to compute auth-cookies for the
large number of sites where we do not have (or do not want to
generate) accounts. For many sites that we aim to study, we
might not even be able to obtain accounts because account
membership would first require affiliation with some institu-
tion (e.g., an account on a banking site would first require
having a bank account with that institution). The requirement
for a field deployment introduces its own set of challenges,
which we describe below.
Determining the URL to use for computing a site’s auth-
cookies is difficult. On many sites, if the browser visits a
website without a specific path, the browswer is redirected
to a page where the username is visible, which allows us to
complete our test. On other sites, even if the user is logged
in, if we test an incorrect URL (or even the correct URL
with incorrect parameters), the web server may redirect to a
webpage with anonymous context or even log the user out
entirely, which not only prevents us from running our test but
could also disrupt the user who has installed the tool.
Sending incorrect cookies can disrupt the user’s experi-
ence. Sending a website incorrect cookies can cause the
website to log a user out, disrupting the user session. For
example, Facebook has an auth-cookies combination ’xs
AND c_user’, and dropping xs resets the c_user cookie
and logs the user out. Thus, we needed to devise a mechanism
to send arbitrary cookie sets from a real user’s browser with-
out disrupting the user if we send an incorrect or invalid set
of cookies. To do so, we run all tests using an in-memory set
of shadow cookies that mimic the user’s real set of cookies.
Testing by removing cookies from HTTP requests is not
effective. Because a browser automatically sends present
cookies stored in the user’s browser, a tool could perform
tests by temporarily suppressing cookies from HTTP requests.
Unfortunately, doing so runs the risk of interfering with the
rest of the user’s normal interactions on the site while the
test is underway. Additionally, occasionally a server will
detect the absence of a cookie, set it once again in HTTP
response, and redirect the browser to originally requested
page. This behavior can interfere with testing. Finally, recall
that the tool’s test for successful page load is the presence
of usernames. Yet, a user can have various profile names on
different sites that may be different from the username they
enter to login, and we cannot expect users to configure all
usernames that he has used on various sites.
3.2.3 Timing and transient behavior
Transient failures actions can appear as failed login at-
tempts. The tool might wrongly interpret a failure to success-
fully load a login page as a result of a network or server failure
as a login failure. To mitigate some of these effects, factors
such as the client processor and memory load, as well as
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network reachability, should also be taken into consideration
before starting off this investigation.
A user may log out during a test. For the tool to compute
auth-cookies for a site, a user must be logged into the site in
the first place. Yet, in the absence of a successful log in event,
detecting whether a user is logged in is difficult. Additionally,
a user might log out in the middle of the investigation, or a
session might timeout. In such cases, if the tool notices that a
user is logged out but does not determine that the logout was
due to a user-initiated action, the tool might wrongly infer
that certain cookies were part of the set of auth-cookies. In
the case of a session timeout, information from in-progress
tests might also be lost.
3.2.4 Usability Concerns
Because we want our algorithms to be useful to both website
administrators and users, we need to consider various usability
concerns, such as when to execute a particular test and what
action to take if our algorithms detect a vulnerability. One of
the most important concerns is how to compute auth-cookies
at runtime without intefering with a user’s normal browsing
session. We perform a backup of the user’s cookies and run
tests using a “shadow” cookie store to ensure that testing
never interferes with a user’s actual session. The tool also
only performs testing against a particular website when it
determines that a user is not accessing that site. We also
provide the user with various options to control both the
frequency of tests and the types of mitigating actions to take
if the tool detects a vulnerability.
4 Newton: Computing Auth-Cookies
In this section, we describe the design of Newton, a tool that
we have built to help website administrators in auditing and
common users to protect their web sessions. We refine the
basic idea that we presented in Section 3.1 to address the
various practical concerns that we raised in Section 3.2.
4.1 Detecting Login Status: Username Presence
Newton uses the presence of the user’s name on the webpage
to determine that the user is logged in. To detect the presence
of a user’s name without explicitly asking the user (which
is error-prone in any case, since the webpage may display a
real name to a logged-in user, rather than the username), we
developed a domain specific language that allows us to specify
how to scrape a user’s username and other information from
different sites. Using this language, we developed scraping
scripts for many popular top sites, including Facebook,
Google+, Amazon, and many dating sites to determine a
user’s real name and username.
Determining a user’s login status on a broad range of sites
using the presence of a username or real name on the page
requires multiple bootstrapping steps. First, we create dummy
accounts on an initial “seed” set of sites to help us codify
the relationship between the site’s structure and the location
on the site where the user’s name resides. Knowledge of
Figure 4: Bounded complete partially ordered set (POSET) repre-
senting the set of all cookie-set combinations that Newton would
have to test without optimizations. In each testing round, Newton
alternately tests current “tops” or “bottoms” of the POSET. After
each testing round, tested cookie-sets are removed from the POSET.
these relationships allows us to develop scripts in our domain
specific language to scrape real names and usernames from
these sites for any user who installs Newton. We then ran
Newton for each webpage for each of the sites where we can
determine these relationships. Newton then determines the
auth-cookies for each of these webpages (using the algorithms
that we describe below). After the user installs Newton, the
tool can determine whether a user is logged in on these sites
by examining whether the appropriate auth-cookies are set; it
can then determine the user’s name (or username, depending
on the site) by scraping the page. Finally, with knowledge
of the user’s name(s) and username(s) from these seed sites,
Newton can then determine whether a user is likely logged in
on other sites (e.g., banking sites) simply by checking for the
user’s name (or username).
Using our domain specific language, we have created 70
scraping scripts for top sites where users have accounts usu-
ally such as social networking, mailing, utility sites. Using
these, we are able to comprehensively cover different vari-
ations in a specific user’s usernames and thus detect these
usernames on sites, even on sites for which we have not
written a scraper. However, even if we fail to detect some
user’s username on some site, Newton can still determine the
auth-cookie combination for that site by performing the auth-
cookie computation for a user who we are able to identify
for that site. Because the auth-cookies that a site uses are the
same for every user, Newton can build a knowledge base of
auth-cookies for a large set of sites that is then shared across
Newton users.
4.2 Tackling Combinatorial Explosion
The strawman algorithm in Section 3.1 computes auth-
cookies by disabling combinations of cookies and determin-
ing whether a user remains logged in. Although this approach
is simple and effective, it does not scale in practice, because
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Figure 5: Suppose that (A&B) is the auth-cookies combination.
Newton does not know that. A page fetch request will not succeed if
cookie A is not present in the cookie-set. From that result, Newton
will conclude that A is part of auth-cookies combination. But, now
it does not need to test other cookie-sets that do not contain A.
the number of tests is exponential in the number of cookies
that a site sets, and many sites sent tens or hundreds of cook-
ies; once the number of cookies on a site exceeds about 30,
testing every combination becomes prohibitive. For example,
live.com sets 27 cookies at login time. Assuming a single
test requires about 200 ms, testing all combinations of only
those cookies would require nearly a year. In this section,
we discuss how to avoid the exponential cost of testing every
possible cookie combination. Although the search space re-
mains exponential, Newton can use knowledge from previous
results to avoid testing certain combinations of cookies.
4.2.1 Basic optimization
First, Newton partitions the cookies for a site into two sets:
“login cookies” (set during a user’s login process) and “non-
login cookies” (set either before or after the login event). To
reduce testing time where possible, Newton initially assumes
that a site’s auth-cookies are a subset of the cookies that
are set at login (the “login cookies”). As we discussed in
Section 3.2, some auth-cookies may not be set at login, and
Newton may need to expand the set of cookie-sets that it is
testing to include additional cookies. Newton handles this
case as well, but we describe the simple case first.
Figure 4 illustrates bounded partially ordered set represent-
ing all possible cookie-sets that Newton would have to test,
either working downward from the top of the graph by adding
cookies to an empty cookie-set, or by working upward from
the bottom by removing cookies from a complete cookie-set.
The Newton algorithm alternates by performing one test from
the top of the partially ordered set, followed by one from
the bottom, removing cookie-sets from the graph as they are
determined to either represent an auth-cookie set or not. The
algorithm terminates when no cookie-sets remain.
At first glance, it might appear that if a website sets N “lo-
gin cookies”, then Newton would need to send HTTP requests
Figure 6: Suppose that (A&B) is the auth-cookies combination.
Newton does not know that. A page fetch will succeed because both
A and B are included. From this, Newton concludes that either A, or
B, or both are part of auth-cookies combinations. But, now it does
not need to test other cookie-sets with A and B enabled.
to the website with all 2N possible cookie combinations to
determine all sets of cookies that represent auth-cookies. For-
tunately, we can use the outcome of some cookie-set tests to
infer the outcomes for other cookie-sets, precluding the need
to test all sets with HTTP requests. Figure 5 shows one such
inference optimization: if Newton determines that the user is
logged in when all cookies in the cookie-set are sent, but that
the user is logged out when cookie A is not set, then Newton
can conclude that A is part of an auth-cookies combination.
Conversely, if Newton determines that a user is logged in
when all cookies in a cookie-set are sent, and also that the
user is logged in when only cookies A and B are sent, then
Newton can infer that any cookie-set containing A and B will
succeed, and either A or B or both of them are auth-cookies.
Figure 6 shows a similar optimization.
4.2.2 Handling corner cases
User logout or session termination during test. When
Newton is computing the auth-cookies for a particular site,
the user’s session may terminate for a variety of independent
reasons; a user’s session might time out, or a user might ini-
tiate a logout. If these events occur during one of Newton’s
tests, logout should not be attributed to set of cookies that
were being tested at the time the logout occurred. For this
reason, after the computation of the auth-cookies completes,
Newton tests that the user is still logged in by sending all
cookies for the site in an HTTP request. State V in Figures 7
and 8 illustrates this logic.
Finding auth-cookies that are not set at login. As we men-
tioned in Section 4.2.1, sometimes an auth-cookie might be
set at some time other than when the user logs in, either be-
cause the site sets it at some later point after the user logs in
(e.g., as is the case with Google Calendar) or because the auth-
cookie persisted since the user’s previous session. There are
two ways to detect that auth-cookies may be set at times other
8
Figure 7: When testing all current bottom cookie-sets(going UP
in the POSET), if Newton discovers negative test result(testing a
cookie-set still causes user to be logged in), then Newton moves on
to next cookie-set to be tested. However, if the result is positive, then
Newton performs two additional tests: one to ensure that there are
no additional auth-cookies that are in non-login cookie set(state S2),
and one to ensure that we have not mistakenly assumed a disabled
cookies as an auth-cookie combination because a user was logged
out during testing(state V ).
than when the user logs in; states S1 and S2 in Figures 7 and
8 show the logic to detect these corner cases. For example, in
Figure 7, if a set of cookies from the “login cookies” set does
not log a user in, but enabling all of the cookies that are not
set at login results in a successful login, then Newton detects
that one or more cookies that were not set at login must be
part of the set of auth-cookies. In this case, Newton must
actually proceed to compute the exact auth-cookies present
in “non-login cookies” set. To do so, Newton constructs a
partially ordered set of “non-login cookies” similar to the one
shown in Figure 4 to find the additional auth-cookies.
5 Newton: Implementation and
Performance Evaluation
We describe the implementation of Newton as a Chrome
browser extension and our evaluation of its performance on
real-world webpages and services.
5.1 Prototype: Chrome Browser Extension
We implemented Newton as a Chrome browser extension.
Our code is open source, and interested security auditors can
download, install it and start using with minimal configuration.
Table 1 shows the breakdown of functions in terms of lines of
code. Except for the scrapers of site-specific content, all of
Figure 8: In contrast to Figure-7, while testing all current
tops(coming DOWN in the POSET), a negative test result occurs
when user is not logged in(expected result with most of the cookies
blocked) where as a positive test result is when a user is still logged
in. To save unnecessary testing, we swapped the order of S1 and
S2 to accommodate this test result role reversal. Once again state
V is executed to ensure that previous negative result is not due to
legitimate session log out.
Function Lines of code
State Machine Driver 5,000
Cookie-set generation and optimization 1,700
State management and miscellaneous 1,300
Testing 800
Interpreter for scraping language (DSL) 1,600
Site specific content scrapers for 70 sites (DSL) 4,600
Total 15,000
Table 1: Approximate lines of code to implement the Newton Chrome
browser extension. All lines of code are Javascript except for the
site-specific content scrapers, which are in Newton’s domain specific
language.
the code was written in Javascript; we write the scrapers in a
domain specific language.
A significant portion of the code resides in two modules. A
major component of Newton’s function is the state machine
driver, which determines which elements in the partially or-
dered set from Figure 4 have been tested, how to generate
the next tests based on previous results, and when to termi-
nate and produce the set of auth-cookies. The state machine
driver must also distinguish significant results from false pos-
itives that may arise due to network delay or other failures,
as shown in Figures 7 and 8. To distinguish performance
problems from login failures, Newton maintains a moving
average of successful page load time. During a test, if a page
fetch or load is not complete successfully within a factor of
three of this time, Newton considers the result significant.
The state management logic copes with cases when a web
session times out or user logs out in the middle of testing,
Newton needs to periodically store the state of testing on a
persistent device. This functionality is especially useful for
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1 < d i v name=" dropbox ">
2 < a c t i o n t y p e =" f e t c h− u r l ">
3 h t t p s : / / www. dropbox . com / a c c o u n t # s e t t i n g s < / a c t i o n >
4 < d i v name=" f i r s t−n a m e " c a n _ b e _ a _ n u l l =" no">
5 < a c t i o n t y p e =" s t o r e " f i e l d _ t y p e =" e d i t a b l e ">
6 t d : c o n t a i n s ( " F i r s t name " ) +> i n p u t
7 </ a c t i o n >
8 </ div >
9
10 < d i v name=" las t−name " c a n _ b e _ a _ n u l l =" no">
11 < a c t i o n t y p e =" s t o r e " f i e l d _ t y p e =" e d i t a b l e ">
12 t d : c o n t a i n s ( " L a s t name " ) +> i n p u t
13 </ a c t i o n >
14 </ div >
15
16 < d i v name=" e m a i l " c a n _ b e _ a _ n u l l =" no">
17 < a c t i o n t y p e =" s t o r e "
18 j q u e r y _ f i l t e r =" remove−ch i ld ren ">
19 t d : c o n t a i n s ( " Email " ) +
20 </ a c t i o n >
21 </ div >
22 </ div >
Figure 9: Example of domain specific language for finding and
a user’s full name on Dropbox. For sites where we were able to
create dummy accounts, we could write modules to infer the user’s
username or full name from the site, which would then allow Newton
to determine if a user was logged in.
web applications that have very short session time outs for
security such as banking sites. However, the next time user
logs in, the number of cookies created can be different from
previous session. Our state management code takes care of
resolving such differences.
Another significant component is the set of site-specific
scrapers of usernames and URLs. The domain specific lan-
guage that we implemented can traverse the user’s account
using directives to fetch a URL, follow a link, simulating a
click and storing information. (We have implemented this
tool to gather data for other studies, but for this paper we
are only using the function involving username inference.)
All users who have installed the tool have consented to both
the installation and the use of the data for the purposes of
this study. As previously mentioned, computations about a
site’s auth-cookies can be shared across users. To protect user
privacy, however, we never associate a computation of a site’s
auth-cookies with a particular user (or username), and New-
ton always asks for the user’s permission before uploading
any data from the local machine.
Figure 9 shows an example of a scraper for
dropbox.com. The code instructs the browser to
go to the settings page for the user (line 3) and locate the
HTML tags that correspond to the first and last name of
the user (lines 5–14); it then stores the information to local
storage (lines 16–21). We have shown one of the simpler
examples of a scraper for simplicity; more examples are
available on Github.2
5.2 Performance Evaluation
As we discussed, we envision that in addition to website
administrators, users might also use Newton to detect when
2We will make the location of the code public when the paper is published.
they are visiting vulnerable websites in real time. To evaluate
the feasibility of this use case, we explore the number of page
fetches, time, and amount of data required to compute the
auth-cookies. The tests in this section were performed from a
laptop on a residential network with downstream throughput
of about 6–7 Mbps in the United States in 2014.
Figure 10a shows a distribution of the number of page
fetches that are required to compute the auth-cookies for a
particular site. Newton can compute auth-cookies for 90% of
sites with fewer than 100 page fetches; the median number
of page fetches to compute auth-cookies for a site is 25. Fig-
ure 10b shows that about 80% of these computations require
less than four minutes to complete, and Figure 10c shows that
about 80% of these computations require the client to down-
load less than 20 MB of data from the webpage for which
Newton is performing the auth-cookie computation. These
results show that Newton is efficient enough to operate in
practice. We have released Newton to a set of alpha users,
who have been using the tool for about three months; none
of these users have experienced any performance problems
or disruptions as a result of running Newton. We will release
Newton, as well as the source code for Newton and the data
from the analysis in this paper when the paper is published.
Another possible concern is that Newton might introduce
excessive server load. As shown in Figure 10a, Newton can
compute auth-cookies for most sites with fewer than 100
HTTP requests; most web applications are designed to handle
many more requests at much higher rates. We also note
that the results of Newton’s auth-cookie computations are
not specific to each user, so if Newton shares the results of
these computations across users, users can avoid redundant
computation.
6 Case Studies and Recommendations
In this section, we use Newton to investigate how 45 different
popular websites use auth-cookies for client authentication.
Newton uncovered many design flaws and vulnerabilities,
many of which could be exploitable in the context of the
scenarios that we outline in Section 2. Based on these case
studies, we develop a set of “best practice” recommenda-
tions for using auth-cookies for client authentication and also
discuss the “cost” of implementing these recommendations
for site operators. In some ways, this section represents a
much-needed re-appraisal of the recommendations from Fu
et al. more than ten years ago [13], when client authen-
tication on the web was much simpler. In addition to the
specific recommendations that we offer, we hope that users,
web application developers, and website administrators can
use the auditing functions and recommendations that Newton
provides to improve the security of client authentication on
today’s websites.
6.1 Setting the secure flag
An attacker can gain access to user’s private account if he is
successful in stealing at least one complete auth-cookies com-
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(a) Number of page fetches. (b) Time. (c) Data.
Figure 10: Page fetches, time, and data required to compute auth-cookies.
bination. As mentioned in Section 2, an attacker who controls
hop in victim’s network path (e.g., as an open WiFi router,
operated as a rogue, unscrupulous ISP, or other untrusted
third party) can induce the victim’s browser into divulging
all cookies for which the secure flag is not set. For this
reason, we recommend that at least one auth-cookie in each
auth-cookies combination should have the secure flag.
Our investigation found nine sites that served at least some
content over HTTPS, which would indicate that the auth-
cookies were likely sensitive. In four of those cases, the site
always served content over HTTPS, but no cookie had the
secure flag set. In these cases, an on-path attacker could
still induce the victim to divulge these presumably sensitive
cookies over an insecure channel.
Another five sites served content over both HTTP and
HTTPS; some auth-cookies had secure flag set, but others
did not. Unfortunately, in these cases not enough auth-cookies
had secure flag set to prevent theft of a complete auth-
cookies combination. It is likely that these vulnerabilities
exist because web programmers may not have easy ways
to understand how different auth-cookie combinations grant
control to different parts of a website. In the future, the use
of a tool like Newton could help web programmers eradicate
these types of errors.
We study two use cases where web programmers appear to
have used the secure flag incorrectly:
GoDaddy. Newton discovered that GoDaddy has the follow-
ing three auth-cookie combinations, with seven auth-cookies
that grant access to a user’s private account over HTTPS:
(ATL.SID.IDP AND gdCassCluster.F/cCGwbuE8) OR
(ATL.SID.MYA AND gdCassCluster.osGjBIVhZQ AND
MemAuthId1ANDShopperId1) OR
(auth_idp)
Of these, only auth_idp has the secure flag set to true.
Thus, an attacker might steal any of the other six auth-cookies
that satisfy either of the first two auth-cookie combinations to
gain access to the user’s account.
Yahoo. Newton found that two of the Yahoo’s services have
following auth-cookies combinations:
Yahoo Mail : Y AND T AND SSL
Yahoo Search : Y AND T
Although both of these services serve content over HTTPS,
only the SSL cookie is protected using the secure flag. This
protects Yahoo Mail from cookie theft, but an attacker can
nonetheless steal a second combination of cookies and still
gain access to the complete past search history of the victim.
Implementing this recommendation: Setting the secure
flag for auth-cookies of sites that are accessed entirely over
HTTPS is easy. For sites that offer mixed content, develop-
ers must ensure that the auth-cookie combinations required
for parts of site served over HTTPS are mutually exclusive
from those required for HTTP parts of the site. Although
implementing this recommendation still requires a thorough
analysis of the website’s services, we believe that this is more
practical than HSTS deployment, which can only be imple-
mented on a much more coarse granularity.
6.2 Setting the HttpOnly flag
An obvious mechanism for protecting the theft of auth-
cookies via attacks such as XSS is to set the HttpOnly
flag, but there may be legitimate reasons why a web program-
mer may not want to set the HttpOnly flag. For example,
some Javascript programs may need to access a cookie. The
programmer should always have one auth-cookie in each
combination for which the HttpOnly flag is set. If a web
programmer does not follow this practice, an XSS exploit
or third-party malicious Javascript can gain access to the
auth-cookies.
Newton found seven sites that serve at least part of the
contents or all contents over HTTPS (suggesting that the
content and the cookies should be considered sensitive), yet
did not set the HttpOnly flag to protect all auth-cookie
combinations. Of these seven vulnerable, it appears that
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five of these vulnerabilities result from simple programming
errors, since for those sites, none of the cookies had the
HttpOnly flag. We explore one such use case below.
Amazon. We found that Amazon AWS has the following
auth-cookie combination:
(aws−at−main AND aws−userInfo
AND aws−creds AND aws−x−main) OR
(aws−at−main AND aws−userInfo AND
aws−creds AND
aws−ubid−main AND aws−session−id)
In this case, both auth-cookie combinations are protected
because aws-creds has HttpOnly set to true. Yet, com-
binations to access user’s private account on Amazon’s eCom-
merce site are as follows:
(at−main AND sess−at−main
AND ubid−main AND x−main) OR
(at−main AND sess−at−main AND
ubid−main AND session−id)
None of these cookies have the HttpOnly attribute set, leav-
ing authentication to Amazon’s eCommerce site vulnerable
to cookie-stealing and authentication attacks.
Implementing this recommendation: A site operator can
ensure that setting HttpOnly would not break site func-
tionality by searching over the site’s Javascript code to de-
termine if whether any Javascript accesses the HttpOnly
auth-cookie. In cases where all auth-cookies are accessed by
Javascript code, the operator can secure the site by adding
one more required auth-cookie to each combination that has
the HttpOnly attribute.
6.3 Using auth-cookie entropy across sessions
At least one auth-cookie from each combination should
change its value across the user’s login sessions. If the auth-
cookie values remain unchanged across different sessions,
then a single theft of auth-cookies could enable an attacker
to continue authenticating to a web service as the user for an
indefinite amount of time. We found that six different sites
did not change the client auth-cookies across sessions. Four
of these sites also send auth-cookies in HTTP cleartext and
are thus vulnerable to other attack vectors. We found Twitter
and GoDaddy to be particularly vulnerable:
Twitter. Twitter has only one auth-cookie combination
with a single auth-cookie: auth_token. The value of this
cookie is 40 hex characters that is constant across sessions.
Also because of this, if attacker steals this cookie, then she
can login to victim’s account even if victim is not logged in.
GoDaddy. In the case of GoDaddy, we observed that only
auth_idp changes in its value across sessions. All other
auth-cookies retain their value across sessions, meaning that
even though auth_idp changes, other static auth-cookies
could be used to re-authenticate the user even after a session
has expired.
Some web applications change auth-cookies across differ-
ent sessions, but the entropy of these changes is low. For
example, Facebook has two auth-cookies, c_user & xs.
The c_user cookie is a user ID that does not change. The
xs cookie appears to change across sessions; this cookie
has 36 characters that has multiple components, as follows:
119:ZHA1W3C7c7aBar:2:1406528127:6694. Only
the second part of this string is truly random; the other com-
ponents are guessable, as they refer to characteristics such as
the time when the user logs in.
Implementing this recommendation: The wide variety of
cryptographic libraries in different web languages make it
possible to use cryptographic primitives to introduce more
entropy into session cookies; the challenge, of course, lies in
selecting good inputs to these functions that serve as reason-
able sources of entropy that are difficult to guess [1].
6.4 Invalidating auth-cookies upon logout
When a user explicitly initiates a log out action, it should
invalidate the auth-cookies used in that session. If a site
does not follow this practice, an attacker who can obtain
the auth-cookies by the methods that we have discussed can
authenticate as the user. If sites do not invalidate auth-cookies
at logout, the logout action is essentially meaningless, and the
user actually has no control over their sessions: a user may
think he or she has logged out, but as long as the auth-cookies
remain present and are not invalidated, the user is logged in.
Newton found 18 sites where past session cookies allowed an
attacker access to an account where the user was logged out.
If auth-cookies are not reset or invalidated when a user logs
out, the cookies may also compromise a user’s anonymity.
Because the auth-cookie still carries the same value from the
time when the user was logged in, all activity from the current
anonymous context can be tracked to the user’s real account
on that site. Newton found five sites that do not modify their
auth-cookies after the user has logged out, including Amazon,
as described in the example below.
Amazon. After a user logs out of Amazon, both
session-id and ubid-main retain their values from
logged in session. Because each of them is a 17-digit number,
each of them provides enough entropy to identify each user.
(at−main AND sess−at −main AND
ubid−main AND x−main) OR
(at−main ANDsess−at−mainAND
ubid−main AND session−id)
Implementing this recommendation: The difficulty of im-
plementing this recommendation depends on the complexity
of the website. Invalidating a user’s auth-cookies upon lo-
gout requires deleting state about a user’s past session. The
growing popularity of NoSQL databases that provide only
eventual (rather than strict) consistency, however, means that
a implementing this feature correctly would require some care
in these cases.
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6.5 Changing auth-cookies when
passwords change
We recommend that at least one auth-cookie in each com-
bination should be derived from user’s password in some
cryptographic way such as HMAC. With this rule, even if
user’s password was leaked to an attacker and if she is using
it to login to victim’s account, as soon as victim realizes this
and changes his password, all the auth-cookie combinations
currently in use by attacker’s session immediately become
invalid. On eight sites (including Monster, Mailchimp, Quora,
OKCupid, GoDaddy, Comcast, and Amazon), we obtained
access to a user’s account after changing the password, using
old auth-cookies that were generated in a past session which
was established after logging in using older password.3 This
vulnerability means that if a user’s auth-cookies are compro-
mised, an attacker can retain access to the user’s account
even after the user discovers a compromise and changes his
password!
Implementing this recommendation: Existing websites al-
ready typically store user passwords as a cryptographic hash.
This existing input could in turn be used to derive an auth-
cookie that changes whenever the user’s password changes.
7 Limitations
We discuss several limitations of Newton and possible areas
for improvement.
7.1 Interfering with the User Experience
Some of Newton’s tests of a website’s practices depend on
interactions with the user that should be as infrequent as pos-
sible or are not guaranteed to occur in the first place. For
example, to test that a site invalidates a user’s auth-cookies
after the user has logged out, Newton would must discover
that user has logged out, restore the previous session cookies,
and test if the user is still logged in. Newton automatically
discovers when a user logs out using various heuristics but to
restore the auth-cookies, we explicitly ask for user permission,
which become annoying if performed repeatedly. Currently
we limit on how many such testing we conduct in a given time
period to reduce this annoyance. Testing whether a website
changes the user’s auth-cookies when the user changes his
or her password requires waiting for the user to first change
his or her password. Currently, Newton automatically discov-
ers when a user changes his or her password for a particular
account, at which point it subsequently performs testing. Be-
cause Newton must wait until a user changes his or password
to perform this test, we cannot guarantee that Newton always
performs this test.
Because Newton retrieves webpages repeatedly while sup-
pressing different combinations of cookies, a possible con-
cern is that such repeated requests might have unintended
3We performed our tests of stale auth-cookies approximately ten minutes
after changing the user password. It is possible that some of these sites may
invalidate auth-cookies on a slower timescale.
or unforeseen side effects. An HTTP GET request is idem-
potent [12], so it should only have an effect the first time
the user performs the request. It is possible that repeated
requests might have unintended side-effects, however (e.g.,
a user might be rate-limited if the client is perceived to be
performing excessive requests), so we must be cognizant of
this possibility when designing tests for specific sites.
7.2 Dealing with More Complex Websites
Every website is different, so Newton of course is not guar-
anteed to work flawlessly on every site. In this section, we
mention certain instances where Newton did not work as
expected. First, Newton decides whether a combination of
auth-cookies results in a successful authentication based on
whether the username is visible on the site. In some cases,
however, we observed that if certain auth-cookies are miss-
ing, a web service may take more time to load (e.g., Paypal
attempts to reset missing auth-cookies) or wait for a user to
confirm his or her identity (e.g., Netflix asks for additional
input). In these cases, Newton may erroneously conclude that
the client failed to authenticate; in these cases, Newton may
erroneously conclude that a certain cookie combination is an
auth-cookie combination.
As we discussed in Section 4.2, because Newton considers
the entire search space of cookie combinations, the tool has
no false negatives. Yet, due to the absence of usernames on
some pages during a test sequence, Newton might have false
positives (i.e., cases where a set of cookies are not in fact
auth-cookies). In some other cases (e.g., Stackoverflow), the
page does not ever show a username, even if the user is logged
in. Some of these cases can be solved with heuristics, such
as waiting longer for the page to load or looking for certain
features of the page other than the username—in some cases,
however, manual auditing may be necessary.
Second, some sites such as Bank of America have a very
large number of auth-cookies. Newton identified 28 of the
auth-cookies on Bank of America but was not able to identify
the complete set of auth-cookies in a reasonable amount of
time. Even though, for this particular site, Newton could not
completely enumerate all auth-cookies, Newton determined
that the SMSESSION is necessary for authentication. In this
case, SMSESSION has both the secure and HttpOnly at-
tributes, so we were able to determine that Bank of America’s
auth-cookies were secure.
Finally, some sites have more complicated authentication
mechanisms that can frustrate Newton’s heuristics. For ex-
ample, Newton assumes that all of a user’s authentication
tokens are client-side auth-cookies, but, in rare cases (e.g.,
Grubhub), some sites maintain the user’s login status on the
server. In these cases, when the user logs out, the login state
is maintained on the server side. Even though all cookies are
still present, the user will be logged out, but Newton would
mistakenly conclude that the user remains logged in. More
complicated sites may also have multiple auth-cookie com-
binations, each of which determines different levels of site
access. These more situations are corner cases today, but if
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these approaches become more common, future research may
need to expand on Newton’s techniques.
8 Related Work
At that time, only single authentication cookies were used;
although many of the recommendations from that work are
now commonplace, the rise of complex web applications
and authentication mechanisms begs for a re-appraisal of
client authentication. The Open Web Application Security
Project (OWASP) has set security guidelines that recognize
the importance of this problem and also acknowledge that
simply setting secure and HttpOnly flags on cookies is
not a viable means of securing auth-cookies for many web
applications [25]. Other projects have explored both the
security and privacy risks of exposed auth-cookies [7, 26, 30].
Existing browser-based security extensions attempt to pro-
tect a user’s auth-cookies by setting the HttpOnly and
secure flags and preventing these cookies from being acci-
dentally passed to other domains [6,8,10,22,28]. All of these
extensions rely on accurate mechanisms for computing the
auth-cookies for a site; Newton can provide this capability.
Various other systems (e.g., SessionShield [22], ZAN [28])
have attempted to identify the cookies that serve as session
identifiers, but, in contrast to Newton, none of these systems
can identify auth-cookies. HTTPSEverywhere is a Chrome
extension that forces traffic over HTTPS whenever possi-
ble [11], which may not always protect auth-cookies and may
also hamper performance.
Concurrent work from Calzavara et al. has developed a
supervised learning algorithm that attempts to identify auth-
cookies for different sites [8]. The approach uses an approach
similar to that which we describe in Section 4.2 to compute
auth-cookies for user accounts in a controlled lab setting;
using these sets of auth-cookies, the algorithm attempts to
learn various features of auth-cookies to enable automatic
detection of auth-cookies on other sites. The work differs
from ours in several important ways.
First, the approach does not scale to general users and
websites, because training the algorithm requires usernames
and passwords, and because the algorithm can only estimate
the auth-cookies of unknown websites. Unlike Newton, it
cannot predict the exact auth-cookie combination for a pre-
viously unknown site when running on a user’s machine. In
contrast, Newton detects different auth-cookie combinations
for different services in the same domain. Newton also com-
putes auth-cookies “in the field” on arbitrary websites, rather
than in the lab on much more limited set of sites. Second,
Newton’s performance optimizations allow it to run in the
user’s browser at runtime as a Chrome browser extension and
compute auth-cookies for previously unseen websites, which
allows it to gather more data from more users. Newton is
thus both more scalable, more accurate, and more robust to
changes in auth-cookie features that may occur over time.
Web applications can be sandboxed to prevent third-party
Javascript libraries from leaking users’ information [16, 29];
these systems solve a more general problem and require
changes to underlying Javascript engines. Other approaches
to add cryptographic properties to cookies [9, 13, 20] comple-
ment our recommendations.
Nearly 13 years ago, Fu et al. examined the use of cookies
for client authentication on the web and uncovered various
vulnerabilities; since this time, of course, the web has become
increasingly complex [13].
9 Conclusion
The increasingly complicated nature of cookie-based au-
thentication mechanisms on modern websites exposes clients
to a new set of vulnerabilities. Websites have become so com-
plex that it may be difficult for a user, website administrator,
or web application programmer to determine which cookies
are responsible for authenticating a client to different parts of
a website, let alone whether a website’s auth-cookie mecha-
nisms are vulnerable to attack. Website designers and web
application programmers need better tools to evaluate site
security, as well as recommendations for best practices for se-
curing these cookies. Towards these goals, we have developed
a general algorithm to discover all auth-cookie combinations
that will permit a user to access a site for any service on
a particular website, including sub-services that are offered
from the same website or domain (e.g., Amazon Web Services
vs. Amazon Shopping, Google Mail vs. YouTube). We have
implemented this algorithm as a Chrome browser extension,
Newton, which can discover auth-cookie combinations for a
website without any prior knowledge about the website or the
user. Our analysis of 45 popular websites revealed security
vulnerabilities in auth-cookie combinations on 29 sites that
could be exploited by relatively weak attackers. We used the
case studies of vulnerabilities that we present to offer specific
recommendations that could significantly improve website
security with relatively little additional effort.
We are planning a public release of Newton; crowdsourc-
ing data about auth-cookie mechanisms can ultimately help
both users and web developers quickly identify and eradicate
vulnerabilities in auth-cookies. We believe that Newton will
be particularly useful to users who access the network via
untrusted access points (e.g., in hotels, coffee shops, and other
public places). In these scenarios, Newton might ultimately
take a more proactive role in protecting auth-cookies by ensur-
ing that sensitive auth-cookies are not unnecessarily passed
in the clear and possibly even proactively setting secure
flags on sensitive cookies in the auth-cookie combinations.
Newton could also be useful for helping users recover from
attacks such as the recent Heartbleed attack [14], which al-
lowed an attacker to steal auth-cookies even if the client sent
them via HTTPS. As web authentication continues to become
more complex, tools like Newton will increasingly valuable
to users, web programmers, and website administrators.
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